

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION
SECURITY INDEX**

FILE NUMBER: 100-358086

SECTION : 13



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

NOTICE

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620
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to
15-13

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 16, 1951

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter Number 26 dated March 13, 1951.

The employment of each Detroit Security Index Subject has been checked against the Vital Facilities list as furnished with No Number SAC Letter dated February 5, 1951. All Subjects who are employed in Vital Facilities or have access thereto have been called COMSAFE. Approximately 180 form FD-122's have been submitted to this effect. The number classified as COMSAFE, out of the present Detroit Security Index total of 723, is now 214.

In the review of the 723 Detroit Security Index cases, it was discovered that 47 cases will require reports on the basis of instructions in Section A of referenced SAC letter.

You will be advised by letter when the last of these reports has been submitted.

UNRECORDED

April 17, 1951

THE DIRECTOR

THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

INTERNAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE INVESTIGATIONS

Security Note - General
On April 16, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

Internal Security-Espionage Conference held April 2-3, 1951, that instructions be reiterated to the field stressing the need for the principal office in Loyalty of Government Employee investigations to follow up from a security angle on any cases where subversive derogatory information is developed.

Internal Security-Espionage
Conference Suggestion:

The conference discussed the problem of correlating Loyalty of Government Employee investigations with the requirements of the Security Index where substantial derogatory information is developed. It was pointed out that because the Loyalty of Government Employee Program and the Security Index Program are worked separately in many instances in the field and at the Seat of Government, we must make sure that subjects of LGE investigations are considered for the Security Index. The conference came to the conclusion that the present instructions cover this situation in that auxiliary offices, when derogatory information is developed, have been instructed to forward copies of reports to the principal office covering the subject's employment. This procedure enables the principal office to recommend continuation of the case as a security matter and possible inclusion in the Security Index. The conference was of the opinion that a Bulletin to the field, reiterating these instructions and calling the problem to the attention of all Agents would be helpful in correcting this situation.

The conference also suggested the Bureau call to the attention of the field the responsibility for submitted supplemental loyalty reports in those instances where additional derogatory information is developed in connection with a completed loyalty case. It was pointed out that the Bureau has a continuing responsibility to advise the Civil Service Commission and the employing agency of developments in closed loyalty cases when derogatory information is received.

The Conference recommended that this Bulletin also stress the fact that during the course of LGE investigations information developed indicating an individual may be a potential saboteur should be furnished to the Bureau by teletype at once so that the data can be disseminated immediately to the interested Intelligence Agencies of the Armed Forces and other interested agencies.

UNRECORDED
4-17-51

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

The conference also was of the opinion that it would be desirable in this same Bulletin to call to the attention of all Agents the necessity of immediately opening cases and considering for inclusion in the Security Index any individual concerning whom information is received during another investigation which would indicate he is a possible risk in a vital facility. It was pointed out that there may be corollary investigation, such as interviews in connection with espionage cases and related matters, wherein derogatory information is developed concerning individuals employed in vital facilities. In such instances the investigating Agent should immediately refer the matter for consideration under the Security Index program.

This Bulletin likewise should stress the absolute necessity for advising the local branches of the Armed Services' Intelligence Agencies in all instances of unfavorable information developed concerning individuals employed in vital facilities.

Executives' Conference
Recommendation

The Executives' Conference unanimously agreed that the overall SAC Letter covering the results of the Internal Security - Espionage Conference should cover the above suggestions. In the event you approve, this will be done.

Respectfully
For the Conference

[I]
DIRECTOR'S NOTATION: "OK.H."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : THE EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE
 SUBJECT: ~~REPORT WRITING~~

DATE: April 17, 1951

M

Security Index General
 The Executives Conference, consisting of Messrs.

, on April 16, 1951, considered certain questions raised by the Internal Security-Espionage Conference, April 2 and 3, 1951, on report writing.

(1) The Internal Security-Espionage Conference recommended that reports on key figures be made only once a year rather than each six months as is now required. It was pointed out that the majority of the information on key figures is repetitious and a report once a year would sufficiently reflect the activities of the subjects to keep the Bureau advised and the file in a current condition.

The Security Division disagreed with the field representatives on the basis that the 1425 key figures represent the top leadership of the Communist Party, USA, and by insisting on reports each six months we are certain that the activities of these subjects are being followed and the Bureau is in a position to follow closely trends and important changes in policy and administrative procedures utilized by the Party.

Executives Conference Recommendation:

The Executives Conference unanimously agreed with the Security Division and recommended that these reports continue to be submitted each six months.

(2) The Internal Security-Espionage Conference pointed out that on ordinary Security Index subjects, upon completion of a thorough investigation and submission of the initial report, the subject is placed in the Security Index and the case is closed. The residence and business addresses of the subject are checked every six months. Informants' reports and information from techs, etc. are channelized into the appropriate file but no reports are required at specific intervals. The Bureau is presently forwarding forms to the field instructing that reports be prepared in numerous instances where a report has not been submitted for several years.

The conference pointed out that while preparation of such reports was desirable, it was not of an urgent nature because

vital information is available in the field office file and the necessary data to permit a pickup program to be put into effect is already available and has been reported to the Bureau. The conference felt that it is imperative at this time to devote all available manpower to the investigations of new security cases for the purpose of placing additional individuals on the Security Index. As we are able to work our cases into shape, we will then be in a position to submit reports at regular intervals on all Security Index subjects.

You will recall that during a recent survey of the Security Index at the Bureau the recommendation was made that prior to June, 1951 the situation be studied and a determination made as to whether the field should be required to submit reports on all Security Index subjects once a year. The conference was strongly opposed to this at this time, feeling that on the basis of handling first things first we must investigate and place on the Security Index those individuals on whom we have received subversive information but concerning whom it has not been possible at this time to initiate investigation.

The Security Division recommended that we cease asking the field to submit reports in the routine security index cases where the subject is on the Security Index; that we re-survey the situation on January 1, 1952, for the purpose of seeing whether, with the additional personnel now assigned to the field, the work is in condition to allow the submission of these reports. This would mean that we will discontinue sending follow-up forms to the field except in urgent cases in order that the field may stress the working of the pending cases.

Executives Conference Recommendation:

The Executives Conference unanimously agreed that it was more important for the field to work the pending cases and that we should not demand reports on those cases now in the Security Index unless individual reasons exist on that particular case. The Executives Conference recommended, however, that the survey of the condition of this work be conducted on September 1, 1951, rather than January 1, 1952.

In the event you approve, instructions will be issued to the field in the over-all SAC Letter being prepared as a result of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

620X3

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 17, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW'S
SECURITY MATTER - C

Security Matter

PURPOSE

To suggest that interviews be had with security matter subjects in certain security matter investigations prior to placing the investigation in a closed status.

DETAILS

Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions indicates that the field should give consideration to requesting Bureau authority to interview security matter subjects in those cases where the investigation has not conclusively established whether or not the subject is potentially dangerous to the internal security of the United States.

It has been noted that in many instances security matter investigations were instituted upon the receipt of alleged membership of the subject in the Communist Party during former years or upon receipt of information that the subject had expressed sympathy for the Communist Party's policies. In many of these investigations the original allegation has been corroborated concerning the subject's former Communist Party membership. However, the investigation has failed to disclose that the subject is now a Communist Party member or has been active in the Communist Party during recent years. In such cases, because the investigation has failed to reflect recent membership or activity the investigations have been placed in a closed status and no recommendation has been made for the preparation of a Security Index card.

In those cases which are predicated upon alleged statements of the subject indicating his sympathy for the Communist Party investigation frequently fails to disclose proof of Communist Party membership or activity which would justify the preparation of a Security Index card. These cases also are placed in a closed status and apparently no consideration has been given by the field to request authority to interview the subject and determine through ~~that~~ interview his present sympathy and affiliations, if any, with the Communist Party.

1

In view of the recent security measures of the Communist Party, it is suggested that information and evidence of Communist Party membership and activity of former known members is not subject to current verification. *by informants or investigation. but may be developed*
RECOMMENDATION *by an interview.*

That consideration be given to instructing the field in each case where investigation has not established current Communist Party membership or activity and no recommendation has been made for the preparation of a Security Index card to request Bureau authority to interview the subject prior to placing the investigation in a closed status. In the absence of such a request that the field advise the Bureau why an interview would be inadvisable.

621

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

To: COMMUNICATION . APRIL 18, 1951

Transmit the following message to: SAC's: BUFFALO

- ✓ BUTTE
- ✓ CL. VILAND
- ✓ DETROIT
- ✓ HOUSTON
- ✓ KNOXVILLE
- ✓ LITTLE ROCK
- ✓ LOS ANGELES
- ✓ NEW HAVEN
- ✓ NEW YORK
- ✓ PITTSBURGH
- ✓ PORTLAND
- ✓ ST. LOUIS
- ✓ SALT LAKE CITY
- ✓ SAN ANTONIO
- ✓ SAN FRANCISCO
- ✓ SEATTLE
- ✓ SPRINGFIELD
- ✓ WASHINGTON FIELD

GENERAL
SECURITY INDEX/DASH VITAL FACILITIES. RE SAC LET TWENTY SIX,
MARCH THIRTEEN LAST. THIRTY DAY DEADLINE PAST. IMPERATIVE
CHECK OF EMPLOYMENT OF S.I. SUBJECTS AGAINST VITAL FACILITIES
LIST BE COMPLETED AND FORM FD ONE TWENTY TWO SUBMITTED WHERE
NECESSARY. HANDLE IMMEDIATELY AND SULET.

HOOVER

cc - Washington Field Office (By Special Messenger)

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47-23

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 19 1951

TELETYPE

WASH FROM SFRAN S 19

4-19-51

2-46 PM

DIRECTOR, FBI

D E F E R R E D

SECURITY INDEX, VITAL FACILITIES. REURTEL APRIL EIGHTEEN LAST.
BY LET APRIL THIRTEEN LAST SF ADVISED IT HAD CHECKED THE EMPLOYMENT OF
ALL SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS AGAINST THE VITAL FACILITIES LIST AND
THAT FORM FD ONE TWO TWO HAD BEEN SUBMITTED WHEREVER NECESSARY.



623
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26-17

APR 19 1951

TELETYPE

WASH 14 FROM LOS ANGELES 19
DIRECTOR DEFERRED

SECURITY INDEX DASH VITAL FACILITIES. REBUTEL APR. EIGHTEEN LAST.
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MY LET APR. FOURTEEN LAST SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS,
ADVISING ALL SI CARDS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND NECESSARY FD ONE TWENTY
TWO-S SUBMITTED.




624
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to
44-11

FROM SALT LAKE CITY 4-19-51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES. REBUTEL 10TH INSTANT. SALT LAKE CITY LETTER MARCH 29 LAST OUTLINING EMPLOYMENT OF SI SUBJECTS ENGAGED IN WORK ON VITAL FACILITIES VERIFIED ON MARCH 27 AND MARCH 29 LAST



SAC, Honolulu

April 9, 1951

Director, FBI

REGISTERED AIR MAIL

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Your file

Bufile

Reurlet March 28, 1951.

Relet refers to thirteen vital facilities designated as such by your office. These designated vital facilities are located in the Territory of Hawaii and are to be handled under the plant informant program. Relet advised that no facilities in the Honolulu Division have been designated as vital by the Secretary of Defense and therefore, no code numbers are available to identify these facilities on Form FD-122 under the caption "Nature of Industry or Business." Urlet states that you believe some notation, such as Vital Facility - (Name of facility involved) is necessary in order that the "Comsab" designation will be adequately explained. You are advised that the use of the code number on Form FD-122 is for the Bureau's use in compiling statistics. The notation, Vital Facility - (Name of facility) will serve no purpose at the Bureau inasmuch as the statistics compiled are made up by using the IBM machine which also creates the Security Index Cards and the code number is essential for this purpose.

The designation "Comsab" on the Form FD-122 does not necessarily mean the individual is employed in a vital facility as there are other circumstances which require a Security Index subject be tabbed "Comsab."

In view of the above, it is not necessary to make a notation on Form FD-122 under the caption "Nature of Industry or Business," such as, Vital Facility - (Name of facility involved).

With reference to the dissemination of reports, your office, under the Delimitation Agreement, has the responsibility of furnishing reports to interested intelligence agencies whenever the facts indicate these agencies have any interest whatsoever. However, there is no doubt regarding the intelligence agencies' interest, it should be resolved in favor of disseminating the reports.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL DATE: 3/21/51
FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
SUBJECT: • SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter 26, Series 1951.

In accord with the above letter, a review of the employment of all Security Index subjects is currently being made and this office is also submitting Form FD-122 on individuals whose employment is included on the most recent vital facilities list which was forwarded with No Number SAC Letter dated 2/5/51.

In addition, reports will be prepared within ninety days on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility where a report has not been submitted and appropriately distributed within the past six months. However, it is desired to bring to the attention of the Bureau a special situation which exists within the San Francisco Field Division, but which to some extent is known to exist on the Seattle, Portland and Los Angeles waterfronts and may also exist on other waterfronts throughout the country. In San Francisco there are several hundred cases involving waterfront workers and seamen who through the course of their employment have regular access to the port of San Francisco, for which the U. S. Coast Guard is both contributing agency and the agency having security responsibility under the Vital Facilities Program. For the past several years it has been the established practice of the San Francisco Office to furnish to DIO, 12th Naval District, copies of reports on waterfront workers and seamen, since under the Delimitations Agreement the Navy was interested in the activities of such individuals.

As the Bureau is aware, during the fall of 1950, with the cooperation of the Bureau, a joint Army-Navy panel in San Francisco instituted a screening program on longshoremen, ship clerks, and various other on-shore waterfront workers, whereby the Army-Navy joint panel would issue badges to those workers who were not deemed security risks. This badge would allow the workers entitled to it to be employed on Army and Navy docks, piers, warehouses and installations in the San Francisco area. The basis for the screening under this program was generally information contained in the files of DIO, 12th Naval District, and G-2, Sixth Army. It should be noted, however, that such information was primarily based on reports of the San Francisco Office, which through the years had been disseminated to DIO and G-2. In addition, in several hundred cases where there was doubt whether the waterfront worker should be screened or not (the so-called "fuzzy" cases), through the cooperation of the Bureau, index checks were made of the San Francisco Office and a summary of information on such individuals was made available to the Joint Army-Navy Screening Panel.

626
changed to 47-18
3-21-51

Director, FBI from SAC, SF
RE: SECURITY INDEX, VITAL FACILITIES

As a result of the action of the Joint Army-Navy Screening Panel, effective January 1951, approximately 360 waterfront workers have been denied badges which would entitle them to work on Army and Navy waterfront installations in Northern California. These included individuals who appear on the San Francisco Security Index, plus individuals whose past activities were not sufficient to include them on the security index at this time, but who nevertheless were deemed security risks by the Army-Navy Screening Panel. Therefore, it can be said with accuracy that the files and summaries prepared by the Army-Navy Screening Panel contain information concerning the activities of practically all on-shore waterfront workers who are deemed security risks.

Under the Magnuson Act and the Presidential Directive implementing the Act, the U. S. Coast Guard has responsibility for complete security on all waterfronts throughout the nation, both on-shore and off-shore employees being included. At San Francisco the Coast Guard has made arrangements with the Joint Army-Navy Screening Panel whereby personal history data, photographs, fingerprints, and the fact that an individual has been deemed a security risk by the Joint Army-Navy Panel is available locally to the U. S. Coast Guard, 12th Coast Guard District. Thus, the Coast Guard is already aware of the fact that the on-shore workers screened by the Joint Army-Navy Panel are considered security risks by that panel.

With regard to seamen, as the Bureau is aware, during 1950 a list was prepared in Washington for the U. S. Coast Guard and distributed to all Coast Guard Districts, listing those seamen who at that time were regarded as security risks and who were not to be allowed to sign on foreign-bound vessels. This list has been supplemented from time to time and is now being utilized by the Coast Guard under the Magnuson Act and the Presidential directives to prohibit seamen from signing on any vessels.

In addition, during recent months, in accord with Bureau instructions, copies of reports concerning all waterfront workers have been distributed locally to the Coast Guard, as well as to G-2 and DIO. In cases where new information concerning subversive activities on the part of waterfront workers is developed reports have been promptly submitted by this office, with dissemination locally to G-2, DIO and the U. S. Coast Guard. In urgent cases more expeditious notification has been employed, which has been followed up by the submission of reports.

In view of the above, it is apparent that G-2, DIO and the U. S. Coast Guard locally have already been made aware of the identity of all those waterfront workers, both on-shore and off-shore, known to this office who could be considered by them security risks. Therefore, the Bureau is requested to consider allowing the San Francisco office not to be compelled to submit reports within ninety days on the several hundred waterfront workers appearing on the security index, with the understanding that within six months, at which time the address and employment of all Security Index subjects in this office will be checked, reports will be written on those individuals employed in all vital facilities,

626 Ranged 47-18
to 3-21-51

Director, FBI from SAC, SF
RE: SECURITY INDEX, VITAL FACILITIES

and, of course, copies of reports on waterfront employees will be distributed to the Army, Navy and Coast Guard. This suggestion would relieve this office of a considerable report writing project at this time in a situation where it is believed such reports are not absolutely necessary.

SYSTEM OF TABBING WATERFRONT WORKERS FOR DETCOM AND COMSAB UNDER
VITAL FACILITIES PROGRAM

It is pointed out that in the majority of instances where Security Index subjects are employed on the waterfront they are not employed by a vital facility. As a matter of fact, in most instances they are not regularly employed by any one company, nor on any one ship, nor at any one dock or warehouse. Under the existing system waterfront workers are employed out of a union hiring hall in the majority of cases. Therefore, on the Security Index card it has been the practice to show the individuals' employment as out of a certain union, since it would only be through such an address that the individual could be promptly located for detention purposes in the event of an emergency.

It is suggested, and unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau the practice will be established by this office, that in cases regarding waterfront workers the employment of the individual on the form FD-122 will be continued as the union hiring hall or other similar name and address, but on the same line on the FD-122 showing employment a statement will be made, "Through employment has access to vital port facilities," and on the last line on the FD-122 the code number of the facility will be shown (32 CG).

UNEMPLOYED WATERFRONT WORKERS

Waterfront Workers Without Union Affiliation:

It has been noted in numerous instances with respect to seamen that seamen who have been screened off ships by the U. S. Coast Guard and not allowed to sail in the regular course of their employment have not been effectively prohibited from access to the waterfront, nor actually from obtaining employment from time to time on vessels. For example, a screened seaman is not allowed to sign ship's articles to sail with the ship, but when a ship is in port a screened seaman very often is employed by the company as a "standby" crew member. For the several days that the ship is in port such a seaman is employed in maintaining the ship, very often in the engine room keeping up steam, etc. He has just as much opportunity to commit sabotage as he would have had he been allowed to sign on a voyage.

626 changed to 47-18
3-21-51

Director, FBI from SAC, SF
RE: SECURITY INDEX, VITAL FACILITIES

In some instances "right-wing" waterfront unions have actually expelled members because of Communist activities on the part of such members. Therefore, such individuals are not only subject to Coast Guard Screening, but actually they are not employable in their regular position, since they do not belong to a union. It has been noted, however, that in some instances such individuals have gone aboard ships when the ships were in port and taken such menial jobs as baggage handlers, etc., and in some instances they have gone aboard ships to visit their friends, etc. They have just as much opportunity to commit sabotage or any other subversive act as they ever had.

This situation is known to the U. S. Coast Guard locally and as soon as it perfects its screening system and obtains sufficient personnel it is assumed that the Coast Guard will prohibit such activities. In the meantime, it is the recommendation of this office, and this office will follow such recommendation unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, that these individuals will be maintained as DETCOM-COLISAP even though they are not regularly employed on the waterfront, as long as they do have access to the waterfront and to vessels.

If possible, the Bureau is requested to sutel replies to the suggestions and recommendations made in this letter.

SAC, San Francisco

March 27, 1951

Director, FBI

AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
CONFIDENTIALSECURITY INDEX
VERAL FACILITIES

Reurlet 4-41-51, and SAC letter no. 20, Series 1951, dated March 10, 1951. Referenced letter refers to Bureau instructions to submit reports within 30 days on all Security Index subjects employed in veral facilities whose names have been submitted within the past six months.

Your letter states that your office has in the past furnished reports to the U. S. Coast Guard, 1-2 and 113, and also furnished information which was used by the Army - Army Accounting Panel and Bureau of Civil. These agencies have already been made aware of the necessity of all these information reports from your office and could be considered security risks by the above agencies. As a result of your case confidential, the reports should not be submitted within 30 days of the interview. Where those names appear in the Security Index also a consideration must be given within six months, as well as the names and a list of all Security Index subjects who are employed in veral facilities on those individuals who are listed in veral facilities. Based on your statement that the individuals who are directly aware of the identity of all individual interview reports made to your office that might be considered a security risk, you are granted authorization not to submit the reports within the 30-day period on those Security Index subjects employed at the interview.

It will be necessary for you to advise the Bureau on all other Security Index subjects employed in veral facilities and you must be certain that the reports on these individuals whose names appear in the Security Index are submitted within six months.

It will be necessary for you to advise the Bureau on letter from the Bureau on the reports on Security Index subjects owned by an individual who are and whether or not they have submitted the reports on all veral facilities and names appear in the Security Index.

Referenced letter contains information on Security Index subjects employed in veral facilities and a list of all veral facilities.

as such because they are not employed regularly by any one company, nor on any one ship, nor at any one dock or warehouse but are employed out of a hiring hall. It is desired that in view of this situation, you have followed the practice of showing the individual's employment as out of a certain union since that is the address where the individual can be located.

You advise that your office intends to follow the practice of showing waterfront workers of another type employed on Form FD-128 (used in connection with security investigation) the union hiring hall or other address and address in the space for "employment" and, in addition, a statement will be made "through employment is access to vital port facilities," and on the last line of the Form FD-128, the name number of the facility will be shown. The waterfront workers with your practice in handling Form FD-128 of waterfront workers. You should be certain, however, to show the employment as out of a certain union hiring hall and not to give the erroneous impression that the individual is working for the union as such.

Waterfront Workers Without Union Affiliation

Waterfront Workers Without Union Affiliation

Referenced letter points out that in some instances with respect to persons who have been screened or shown by the U. S. Coast Guard, there is a tendency to show the individual as unemployed and have an opportunity to be employed.

Your letter also points out that some waterfront unions have actually expelled members because of their Communist activities and that some individuals on occasion have been shown as being on the ships and in the waterfront area as having no handlers or to be with their friends and, therefore, have an opportunity to drift around.

It is noted that the United States Coast Guard is aware of the fact that some individuals are shown as being unemployed and that such individuals are shown as being unemployed and that such individuals are shown as being unemployed and that such individuals are shown as being unemployed.

626 change
to 47-18
3-27-51

Detcon-Consab even though they are not regularly employed on the waterfront. The Bureau agrees with your handling of this type of case. You should, of course, in the event this type of individual is completely eliminated from the waterfront, submit the necessary Form PD-152 requesting a change in Detcon-Consab tabbing.

627 changed
to
34-44

RECEIVED
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 20 1951

TELETYPE

WASH FROM NEW YORK 20

20

6-34 P

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

SECURITY INDEX DASH VITAL FACILITIES. REBUTEL EIGHTEENTH INSTANT.
SEE NYLET TO BUREAU DATED APRIL TWELVE, FIFTYONE.

628
changed
to
53-8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 25, 1951

FROM : SAC, WFO

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC letter number 26, series 1951, section A.

This is to advise that the check of the employment of Security Index subjects in the Washington Field Office against the "Vital Facilities" list has been completed.

In those cases where applicable, Form FD-122s have been submitted setting forth the code numbers of the facility in which these persons are employed.

Those persons falling within this category in the Washington Field Office's Security Index are as follows:

624
changed to
29-10

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI


DATE: April 24, 1957

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY DETENTION PROGRAM

Reference is made to No. 100-3-3 Letter, dated April 7, 1957
re SECURITY DETENTION PROGRAM.

Pursuant to the instructions contained therein, this is to advise the Bureau that the Security Index cards for resident agencies have been prepared. Conferences are being held with the Agents and with the Senior Resident Agents and, when the instructions in the referenced letter have been fully and completely carried out, the Bureau will be immediately advised.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 20, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:


SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 131 new cards were added to the Security Index and 9 cards were canceled, a net increase of 122 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,199.



Director, FBI

AMSD

3-21-51

SAC, San Francisco

CONFIDENTIAL

VITAL FACILITIES
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES

Re Number SAC Letter dated 2-5-51 captioned VITAL FACILITIES, NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, INTERNAL SECURITY - C; CONFIDENTIAL FACTS INFORMATION transmitted to the field a new list of Vital Facilities.

SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated 3-13-51 captioned SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES set forth the measures to be followed in handling investigations of Security Index subjects employed in Vital Facilities.

For clarification and further instructions are requested at the earliest possible time regarding the following observations:

ITEM ONE: Reference to Number SAC Letter dated 2-5-51 noted that many of the Vital Facilities on the new list were previously on the list transmitted by Teletype to Albany dated 1-25-50.

QUESTION: If any Vital Facility contained in the list of 1-6-50 is not on the new list, is it a facility still considered a Vital Facility or is it automatically removed from this category by the 2-5-51 list?

ANSWER: List of 1-6-50 listed " " as a Vital Facility. It is not on the new list of 2-5-51.

ITEM TWO: Reference to Number SAC Letter dated 2-5-51 mentioned SAC Letter No. 43 dated 7-1-47 created permission to set up special indices on Vital Facilities and FBI instructions: "set up list to include all other confidential offices dated 1-2-50, with a list of Vital Facilities. The Bureau instructed these two special indices were to be discontinued immediately.

QUESTION: In this connection, may cards which have accumulated in these two special indices be destroyed? Should the cards be destroyed? If not, should the Bureau in reference to Number SAC Letter serve the same purpose?

63/changed
47-19 to

Director, FBI

3-21-51

Re: VITAL FACILITIES
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

ITEM 51-22: Reference to Number SAC letter dated 2-4-51 set forth local dissemination of information relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activity affecting the vital facilities mentioned by the Bureau to the field should be made to the intelligence officers of the agencies listed in the items of the Vital Facilities list headed "Comm." (communications) and "Mater." (material responsibility) except to the following: Munitions Board, Research and Development Board, U. S. Maritime Commission, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and Civil Aeronautics Administration. It is observed this statement would qualify the following remaining agencies set forth by the Bureau in Number SAC letter to receive copies of reports on a local level: Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard and Atomic Energy Commission.

However, reference to SAC letter No. 24, dated 2-12-51, in the example report on the Atomic Energy Commission, set forth the following statement: "The Atomic Energy Commission has permission will handle dissemination of reports to their local offices."

: In view of apparently contradictory instructions in Reference 19, SAC letter No. 24 dated 2-4-51 and reference SAC letter No. 26 as pertaining to dissemination of reports to the Atomic Energy Commission on a local level, it is requested that the instructions in SAC letter No. 26 pertain only to communications and material facilities and not to other facilities who are responsible as such, or do such instructions supersede those set forth in No Number SAC letter?

Please airtel replies.

631 changed
April 9, 1951

47-19

SAC, San Francisco

Director, FBI

VITAL FACILITIES
NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
CONFIDENTIAL PLANT INFORMANTS

SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

Reurmemo 3-21-51, captioned as above.

In answer to Item 1 in your memorandum, you are advised that if a facility does not appear in the Provisional Key Facilities List (1950), this fact indicates that the facility has completed its contract or connection with the interested branch or branches of the Armed Services or that by comparison it was not deemed as important as other facilities listed in the PKFL (1950). Because a facility is not listed in the PKFL (1950) does not mean, however, that it should be removed from the Plant Informant Index in your office. As you were advised in SAC Letter No. 62, Series 1950, dated August 31, 1950, you should develop confidential plant informants in those facilities engaged in the manufacture of materials vital to the national defense and security and those which may be expected to become so engaged in the event of war.

With regard to Item 2, you are advised that it will be permissible to destroy those cards in Vital Facilities and Proeli indices where the information is duplicated on the subdividing guide cards of the Confidential Plant Informant Index.

Item 3 in your memorandum referred to the dissemination of reports to the Atomic Energy Commission. Your attention is called to page 2 of SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951. The fifth and sixth paragraphs on page 2 are as follows:

"The reports prepared in Security Matter cases where the subject is employed in a plant designated as a vital facility or has access to the facility in the usual course of his employment, should have a statement on the administrative page of each report stating that the individual is employed in a vital facility and setting forth the nature of his responsibility. If the Atomic Energy Commission has an interest, a statement to this effect should also be included on the administrative pages in order that the Bureau will make proper dissemination."

"It will be noted that some of the vital facilities in the list sent to the field offices were marked with an asterisk. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited the Atomic Energy Commission from delegating security responsibility to another agency. The over-all securing responsibility of the vital facilities marked with an asterisk is assigned as indicated in the list without infringement on Atomic Energy Commission responsibility. Necessary arrangements in these instances will be coordinated and delineated locally by the interested agency with AEC."

From the above it will be noted that the agency having over-all security responsibility for a facility should furnish the required information to the local office of the AEC. Accordingly, the instructions contained in SAC Letter No. 26 mentioned above supercede previous instructions concerning dissemination of reports to the AEC. Such dissemination will be handled by the Bureau at the Seat of Government. If some local problem exists with regard to dissemination of reports to the AEC in your territory, you should so advise the Bureau.

632
changed to
52-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

um

• UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
(FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD)
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: April 18, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 26 (A) dated March 13, 1951.

Springfield has completed an employment check of the Security Index subjects maintained by this Office. Form FD-122 has been submitted to the Bureau where necessary.

633
changed
to
44-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TO : Director, FBI

OVERNIGHT

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City

DATE: 4/17/51

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated 3/13/51.

In accordance with instructions set forth in referenced SAC letter, reports have been submitted on nine Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities in this Division and copies of these reports have been disseminated to agencies having an interest. Form FD-122 has been submitted on these nine persons, tabbing them for Comsab.

634
changed
38-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 4-5-51

FROM : SAC, Phoenix

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951.

This is to advise that the employment check of all security index subjects in the Phoenix Division has been completed and that Form FD 122 has been submitted to the Bureau wherever necessary.

The Bureau is also advised that reports of security index subjects employed with a cons. in listed on the Vital Security list have been submitted to the agency having primary responsibility.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI


DATE: April 19, 1951

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERYSUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIESCONFIDENTIAL

Reference SAC Letter #26 Series 1951.

This is to advise that the employment check of all Security Index subjects has been completed and forms FD-112 have been furnished the Bureau indicating the vital facility in which the subjects are employed, and the code number of vital facilities.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M

m • UNITED S

GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, PORTLAND
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

AIR MAIL

DATE: April 23, 1951

Rebutel April 18, 1951.

The Bureau's attention is directed to my letter dated April 14, 1951 which advised that this office does not have any security index subjects employed in any of the vital facilities as furnished by the National Military Establishment.

changed
to
40-10

637 changed
to
42-11

Office Memorandum : UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 19, 1951

FROM : SAC, St. Louis

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC letter No. 26 dated March 13, 1951.

Employment check of Security Index Subjects completed and FD 122 submitted where necessary.



UNRECORDED
Re 74 to
UNRECORDED

4-16-51

DIRECTOR, FBI


SAC, PHILADELPHIA

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FBI IN THE
INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD -
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter No. 33 dated 4-10-51.

For the information of the Bureau the Philadelphia Office has completed a review of its Security Index cards in connection with the above captioned project. The Philadelphia Office has submitted to the Bureau a number of blind memoranda and additional memoranda are in the process of being prepared and will be submitted to the Bureau at a subsequent date for approval.



638 changed to
39-17

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Bufile

DATE: April 26, 1951

This communication concerns the designation and maintenance of certain security index subjects in the "Special Section."

By letter dated April 17, 1950, captioned "SECURITY INDEX - VITAL ACTIVITIES," the Bureau furnished an IEM list of Pittsburgh security index subjects at that time. Attached to this IEM list was a separate typewritten list of six security index subjects. The Bureau made no reference to any specific designation of the subjects listed on the typewritten list; however, it was noted that five of the subjects were employed at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Transportation and Generator Division, 700 Braddock Avenue, East Pittsburgh, Pa., and one was a government employee in the United States Post Office, Pittsburgh, Pa.

By SAC Letter No. 61 dated August 29, 1950, the Bureau advised of the maintenance of a "Special Section" of its Security Index and advised that by letter dated July 31, 1950, the Bureau provided a list of subjects whose cards were to be maintained in the "Special Section." Attached to the Bureau's letter of July 31, 1950, was a list naming six Pittsburgh security index subjects who because of their employment would not be apprehended under the Detcon Program unless the Bureau so specifically instructed. These six security index subjects were the same as the previous six named in Bulet of April 17, 1950. Again five of these subjects were Westinghouse Electric Corporation employees and one was a U. S. Government employee.

On the occasion of the July 31, 1950, letter the Bureau advised that five subjects in the "Special Section" were included in the "Special Section" because of their employment at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation which constituted employment as "Atomic Energy Program - Employees."

In subsequent communications the Bureau continued to designate these same five Westinghouse Electric Corporation employees as "Atomic Energy Program - Employees" and instructed their cards be maintained in the "Special Section."

At the present time this office maintains security index cards on six subjects employed at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, East Pittsburgh, Pa., in its "Special Section." These six subjects are:

/



658 changed
to
39-17

TO: Director, FBI
FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh
RE: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Bufile

April 28, 1951

On all these subjects with exception of the Bureau sent individual case letters to Pittsburgh dated September 12, 1949, wherein it requested that the subject's employment at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation be verified and also requested appropriate inquiry be made at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation to determine if Westinghouse was doing any work in connection with the Atomic Energy Program. By individual letter dated September 19, 1949, the Bureau was advised of the subject's continued employment at Westinghouse and based on information furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, East Pittsburgh, Pa., the Bureau was advised that Westinghouse at East Pittsburgh, Pa., was not engaged in any work connected with the Atomic Energy Program. By individual letters dated October 12, 1949, the Bureau advised that the Atomic Energy Commission had advised on September 19, 1949, that the AEC had at that time a classified contract with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pa. Because of this the above subjects continued to remain in the "Special Section."

638 changed
to
39-17

TO: Director, FBI
FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh
RE: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Bufile .

April 28, 1951

In all cases above dissemination of information has been made to ONI which has primary security responsibility at Westinghouse as well as to other interested intelligence agencies.

In connection with the place of employment of the above-named six individuals it is pointed out that they are employed at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Transportation and Generator Division, 700 Braddock Avenue, East Pittsburgh, Pa. The most recent vital facilities list in this office shows that there are presently twelve Westinghouse Electric Corporation plants designated as vital facilities in the immediate Pittsburgh area.

According to this vital facilities designation it is pointed out that the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Plant at East Pittsburgh, Pa., is listed as a vital facility, also that the Navy has primary security responsibility at this plant. The vital facilities list does not indicate that the Atomic Energy Commission has any security responsibility in connection with this same East Pittsburgh Plant.

In connection with the twelve Westinghouse Electric Corporation Plants designated as vital facilities it is pointed out that the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Westinghouse Atomic Power Division, Chicago AEC Operations Office, Bettis Field, Homestead, Pa., and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Atomic Power Division, Bettis Field, Homestead, Pa., are listed as atomic energy facilities wherein the Atomic Energy Commission has primary security responsibility, and are the only contributing agency.

It has previously been determined from the Atomic Energy Commission Security Office, Bettis Field, Homestead, Pa., that employees at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in East Pittsburgh, Pa., have no connection with the Atomic Energy installation at Bettis Field, Homestead, Pa.

It is the opinion of this office that the six above-mentioned security index subjects, all of whom are employed at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, East Pittsburgh Plant, are incorrectly designated as Atomic Energy Program - Employees. It is believed that none of these individuals, since information has been disseminated to ONI, have access to restricted information during the course of their regular employment at Westinghouse.

TO: Director, FBI
FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh
RE: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Bufile

April 28, 1951

It is also the opinion of this office that unless these individuals are actually employed in some phase of the Atomic Energy Program they should be apprehended along with the general security index subjects since their apprehensions would not jeopardize or retard in any manner any work in connection with the Atomic Energy Program.

Of course, these subject's security index cards will continue to be maintained in the "Special Section" of the Pittsburgh Security Index until the Bureau designates their removal.

Also, of course, the security index card on , United States Government postal employee, will continue to be maintained in the "Special Section."

In connection with the security index card on , Bureau file , Pittsburgh file , which is maintained in the "Special Section" at the Bureau's designation because of his employment at the Elliott Company, Jeannette, Pa., a vital facility, it is pointed out that is no longer employed at the Elliott Company and correspondingly his security index card should be removed and placed in the general security index section. Form FD-122 or FD-126 will be submitted on as soon as his present employment is ascertained.

Other than the eight individuals mentioned herein this office has no other security index subjects maintained in its "Special Section."

It would be appreciated if the Bureau would clarify this designation of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Transportation and Generator Division, East Pittsburgh, Pa., employees as Atomic Energy Program - Employees, particularly since the latest vital facility list does not designate this specific plant as one in which the Atomic Energy Commission has primary security responsibility or has an interest as a contributing agency.

PART TWO

Reference is made to nylet of March 9, 1951, captioned "SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION" and Bulet of March 29, 1951, captioned "SECURITY INDEX," Your file

658 changed to
39-17
April 28, 1951

TO: Director, FBI
FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh
RE: SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Bufile

OK/ In accordance with Bureau suggestion that all security index cards maintained in the alphabetical section (administrative) have no sub division it is pointed out that all cards maintained in this administrative section are filed alphabetically and without break-down.

OK/ The three separate cards that show the names and addresses of the three places included under the Master Search Warrant have been maintained in the Administrative Section as a matter of ready administrative control; however, since the Bureau advised that there is no reason for these cards being filed in the Administrative Section, they have been removed. The Bureau also points out that these same three cards should not be maintained in the "Special Section" of the Security Index because they have no connection therewith. The box designated as the "Special Section" was previously divided and was clearly marked as to contents -- (1. Special Section) (2. Places to be Searched Under the Master Search Warrant) (3. Inactive Section.) This was done to use to the best advantage available filing space inasmuch as this office has only seven "Special Section" cards; three search cards, and one "Inactive" card.

The "Special Section" box was previously clearly marked as to its contents as were the other two Security Index boxes; however, specific mention of this was not made in my letter of March 9, 1951.

32-17
SAC, Pittsburgh

June 11, 1951

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INDEX - SPECIAL SECTION
Pittsburgh file number

Memorandum dated April 23, 1951.

In view of the fact that no work in connection with the Atomic Energy program is being performed at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Transportation and Generator Division, 70 Frazer Avenue, East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the place of employment of the following named individuals, you are instructed to remove their Security Index Cards from the Atomic Energy program employees subdivision of your Special Section and place their Security Index Cards in the Geographical Section of the Security Index:

is no longer employed by the WESTINGHOUSE Company, Jeannette, Pennsylvania. His Security Index Card should be removed from the Atomic Energy program employees subdivision of your Special Section and place his Security Index card in the Geographical Section of your Security Index.

Security Index Cards on the seven individuals named above will be forwarded to you by separate communication. The employment of is being indicated as "unknown" on his Security Index Card. His Security Index Card should be removed from the Atomic Energy program employees subdivision of your Special Section as soon as his new place of employment is determined.

637
changed to
32-22

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES
NEW HAVEN OFFICE

DATE: April 20, 1951

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

ReButel 18th instant.

The Bureau is respectfully directed to New Haven letter to the Bureau dated 3-26-51 in which it was reflected that instructions mentioned in the referenced SAC Letter No. 26 were carried out by this office. Realizing the importance of this program this office had instituted this procedure prior to the receipt of SAC Letter No. 26 and, in consonance with instructions contained in SAC Letter 26, had rechecked the employments of SI subjects against the Index to determine that appropriate action had been taken concerning Security Index subjects employed in Vital Facilities. In addition, the New Haven Office by separate letter in connection with the respective subjects' files has directed letters to the Bureau advising what distribution should be made on a local level.

To reiterate, Bureau instructions as originally contained in SAC Letter No. 26 dated March 13, 1951, have been complied with and the Bureau advised. This program is being maintained in a current status in the New Haven Office.

640 *changed*
47-24

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI . AIR MAIL DATE: 4/21/51
FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter No. 7, Series 1951, which required that a notation be made on the Security Index card when a Security Flash Notice has been posted in the Identification Division at the Bureau.

Due to the large volume of Security Index cases in the San Francisco Office and in order to enable the clerk handling the Security Index to be informed and to post on the Security Index card the above information, Bureau permission is requested to use on a temporary basis the attached blank memorandum. It is believed that this is the only manner in which the information can accurately be brought to the attention of the clerk handling the Security Index.



640 changed
47-24

SAC, San Francisco

April 26, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

Your file

Bureau file

Reurlet April 21, 1951.

Referenced letter requested authorization to use on a temporary basis a form memorandum which would be filled in and routed to the clerk handling the Security Index in order that a notation could be made on the Security Index card in those instances where a Security Flash Notice has been placed in the Identification Division at the Bureau.

You are authorized to use the form memorandum on a temporary basis inasmuch as you believe this is the only manner in which the information can accurately be brought to the attention of the clerk handling the Security Index.

It is pointed out, however, that in the Bureau's opinion your form will not save any time in that the subject's name, file number, and the date the Security Flash Notice was sent to the Bureau could be placed on a routing slip just as quickly as the form memorandum can be filled out.

It is suggested that more time and effort would be saved if the form memorandum were placed in the file to the clerk with a notation on a routing slip showing the serial number in which the Bureau was requested to place the Security Flash Notice.

Mr. Peyton Ford
Deputy Attorney General

Director, FBI

list
CONFIDENTIAL

641
April 26, 1951

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of individuals maintained in the Security Index. This list is subdivided alphabetically under the field offices of this Bureau covering the residence of the individuals listed.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

Note on yellow:

The list furnished Peyton Ford contains the names of all persons on the Security Index with the exception of those in the Espionage sub-division of the Special Section.

*4-30-51
Delivered personally
to Col. W.M. Naramore
at Dept. of Justice
destroyed. One*

RECORDED - 38

MAY 4 1951

view for possible

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FBI
APR 27 9 29 AM '51
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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of 13
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, BOSTON
 SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
 VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: April 30, 1951

Reference is made to SAC letter #26 dated March 13, 1951, which furnished instructions to the field for the handling of Security Index subjects employed at vital facilities.

Referenced letter informed the field that subject's employed in a vital facility or having access to the facility in the usual course of employment should be tabbed COMSAB.

For the information of the Bureau, Harvard University at Cambridge, Massachusetts, has been designated a vital facility by the Department of Defense. The vital facility code numbers applying to Harvard University are as follows:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Contract</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Description</u>
38	N	N	Electronic R&D
38	A		- do - (D)

The Boston Office is in receipt of a Facility Security Survey Report on the president and fellows of Harvard College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, made by the First Naval District at Boston, Massachusetts, which was apparently completed at the request of the Munitions Board.

In this connection, a copy of the survey, as furnished to the Boston Office by the Commandant, First Naval District, indicates the officials of Harvard University stated that Harvard would not care to participate in the survey and declined to furnish data requested by the U. S. Navy.

It is noted the Boston Office has several Security Index subjects located at Harvard University who are either faculty members or members of the student body.

Inasmuch as Harvard University occupies a ground area in excess of 1- $\frac{1}{4}$ miles and has numerous buildings of which Harvard officials contend have no relation to national defense and since the University

has consistently refused to take on classified contracts, there is some question as to the extent or location of the vital facility at Harvard University, if such exists.

Unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, the Boston Office is not submitting as COMSAB subjects the names of members of the faculty or students at Harvard University.

Another question has arisen in connection with officials of the UBRWA, CIO, inasmuch as such officials appear to have an interest in some of the vital facilities from a labor-management standpoint.

2. The Bureau is requested to advise whether the officials of the UE with whom certain vital facilities have labor contracts should be included as COMSAB subjects in the event these officials are presently Security Index subjects.

No action will be taken by the Boston Office in connection with either of the above matters in connection with this program unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 27, 1951

FROM :


SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 100 new cards were added to the Security Index and 15 cards were canceled, a net increase of 85 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,284.



list
SAC, Omaha

644
April 28, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
REGISTERED MAIL
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECURITY INDEX- [redacted]

Rebulet dated December 29, 1950.


There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.

The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.

Enclosure
[redacted]

Sub



RECORDED - 43

APR 28 1951

RECEIVED
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
APR 26 12 51 PM '51
RECEIVED READING ROOM

review for possible
n

Ph.2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 20, 1951

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Charlotte

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

It is noted that in unnumbered SAC letter dated April 4, 1951, entitled "Re: Emergency Detention Program", on page 13 it was set forth that an additional copy of the security index card should be prepared and maintained in the resident agency for subjects residing in that territory, which information is substantially the same as that appearing on the regular security index card maintained in the division office.

It is respectfully suggested that the Bureau may desire to prepare three copies of each security index card at the seat of government, which may be forwarded to the field office rather than the two copies which are presently being received. Following the above procedure the card maintained by the resident agent would be up to date and agree with the card maintained in the field office at all times, and a considerable amount of time would be saved in the preparation of new cards each time a change is made.

It is also suggested that the Bureau might desire to give consideration to utilizing the process now used in preparing the front of the security index card to prepare the reverse side to set forth the description. It is believed that in the event such a procedure is practical, it will save considerable stenographic time in the various field offices and cut down the amount of time spent in handling the security index cards by avoiding the requirement of the field office having to type this description on the reverse side of the card whenever new cards are received. Full descriptions for inclusion on the reverse side of the card, if the above procedure were adopted, could be furnished the Bureau by Form FD 186.

6.75 changed to 8-11

SAC, Charlotte

April 30, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX

Your file

Bureau file

Reurlet April 20, 1951.

Referenced letter suggested that the Bureau may desire to prepare three copies of each Security Index card in order that one copy of the card may be for lead to the interested field office. You advised this procedure would require the field office to make a duplicate of the card and that the original card would be maintained in the field office at all times.

While this suggestion may be practical as it applies to the Security Index subjects in your office, it is not applicable to all offices. In most instances, the number of Security Index subjects residing in areas handled by resident agents is quite small and it is impractical to send three Security Index cards to the field on all Security Index subjects. It is also impractical to adopt a procedure for making three Security Index cards for some Security Index subjects and two Security Index cards for other Security Index subjects due to the volume of Security Index cards being handled at the Bureau.

Referenced letter also suggested that the Bureau might give consideration to utilizing the process now used in preparing Security Index cards to set forth the description on the reverse side of the Security Index card.

This method of preparing the Security Index cards would save your office considerable time; however, it would necessitate the Bureau doing the identical work for all offices that is now being performed by the individual field office.

The suggestions submitted by your office are appreciated; however, they will not be used for the reasons set forth.

646

TO ALL SUPERVISORS ON SECURITY INDEX

March 22, 1951

PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS
SUBDIVISION OF THE SPECIAL SECTION

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 23, Series 1951, dated March 3, 1951. Under the caption "Prominent Individuals"-Special Section-Security Index, on pages five and six of that letter, the Field was issued instructions regarding the handling of cases in this category. The Field was instructed to submit prosecutive-type summary reports in each case in that category. A follow-up letter dated March 21, 1951, has been sent to all offices having cases in the "Prominent Individuals" section instructing that the summary reports should reach the Bureau within two weeks of the receipt of the follow-up letter. Investigative reports are to be submitted each six months thereafter as long as the individual's Security Index card is carried in that category. This type of case will never be placed in a closed status.

You should immediately prepare a three by five card on each case in that category supervised by you. The cards should be maintained in the back of the key figure box behind a breakdown card captioned "Prominent Individuals." Incoming reports should be posted to this card as is done in key figure cases. These cases must be followed to see that reports are submitted by the Field each six months, and that the maintenance of a Security Index card is justified. The cards maintained by you should be kept current at all times as S.I. cards are added or deleted from this subsection.

A list of the cases presently maintained in the "Prominent Individuals" section supervised by the respective Supervisor is attached to a copy of this memorandum.

Upon receipt of the summary reports from the Field, each should be thoroughly reviewed and determination made as to whether or not the derogatory information is adequate to justify the continuance of the person in the Security Index. If it is determined that the information is adequate the summary reports should be sent to the Department. If you

646

determine that the information is inadequate at this time to fully justify the retention of a Security Index card, you should take action to have the card canceled. Even though the card is canceled, you may determine from information developed to date that additional investigation is warranted in an effort to secure sufficient derogatory information to justify a Security Index card. If such circumstances exist the Field should be instructed to continue the investigation.

The Field has been instructed to afford these cases close supervision and you should do likewise.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, FBI

DATE: March 26, 1951

FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC letter No. 26 dated March 13, 1951, requesting a check of places of employment of Security Index subjects with the Vital Facility list furnished in no number SAC letter dated February 5, 1951.

There follows a complete listing of Pittsburgh Security Index subjects who are presently employed in a vital facility or who have access to the facility during the course of their normal employment.



647
changed to
39-13

March 26, 1951

TO: Director, FBI
FROM: SAC, Pittsburgh
RE: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Form FD-122 has been submitted to the Bureau on each of the above individuals showing the responsible agency and all contributing agencies and the appropriate code number or numbers. Also, all subjects were tabbed DETCOM and COMSAB and reports are being prepared for dissemination.

In addition to the individuals listed above the following peculiar circumstances exist. In each of these instances appropriate action has been taken to determine fully if the subject's employment constitutes employment in a vital facility or constitutes having access to a vital facility during normal employment operations. This is deemed necessary to fully determine if the particular subject would be in a position to commit acts of sabotage, espionage, etc.

647
changed to
39-13

SAC, Pittsburgh

April 24, 1951

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX--VITAL FACILITIES

Reurmemo dated March 26, 1951.


The information which you supplied concerning security index subjects has been incorporated into the Bureau's records. Your inquiries concerning the following installations have been referred to the Munitions Board, Department of Defense, and you will be advised when information is received from that Agency:

National Tube Company
National Works
McLeansport, Pennsylvania

Crucible Steel Company
Park Works
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

The Atomic Energy Commission has advised that a complete list of Atomic Energy facilities is being prepared at the present time and that no universities will be designated as vital facilities. Further, a laboratory or individuals connected with classified work will be designated as vital facilities by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(On yellow only) Memoranda concerning the National Tube Company and the Crucible Steel Company have been furnished to the Munitions Board by the Liaison Section.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 4, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 114 new cards were added to the Security Index and 8 cards were canceled, a net increase of 106 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,390.

649
changed
to
23-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT


TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : *lvBe* SAC, KANSAS CITY
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: 5/7/51

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated 3/13/51, Section A, captioned as above.

This is to advise that one Security Index subject in the Kansas City Office is employed in a Vital Facility. In compliance with instructions, a current report has been written and copies furnished to the appropriate military agency, having the security responsibility of the facility.

For the Bureau's information, this Security Index subject is
Bufile SECURITY MATTER - C,



Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 19, 1951

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Los Angeles
SUBJECT: SUGGESTION TO MARK CERTAIN SECURITY FILES
IN A DISTINCTIVE MANNER

There is a problem in the Los Angeles Office and I am confident that it exists in all other offices with a large volume of security work that relates to the prompt handling of files in certain types of security cases.

GENERAL
We now have approximately 10,000 names in the Communist index file and 1,815 in the security index file. These files are being handled constantly by supervisors and others, and it would be of extreme value and would save a considerable amount of time on the part of agent personnel if there were some obvious indication that the individual is the subject of a Communist index card or of a security index card. It is felt that it would be comparatively simple to use a rubber stamp and mark the outside of the file cover with the letters "C.I." or "S.I." as the case may be. This could be about two inches high and would be readily discernible by all employees.

If the Bureau does not favor such a procedure as this, which appears to me to be the simplest, it is recommended that consideration be given to placing as a top serial a sheet of paper of distinctive coloring upon which the letters "C.I." or "S.I." would be stamped. This would not be serialized but would be carried forth as the top serial in the last section of each such file.

As it is now, with the large number of such cases going over the desk, the supervisor must constantly check to see if an S.I. or C.I. card has been prepared, and it should not be necessary to have to check continually for this information.

The latter suggestion was made to me by SA [redacted]. He was also of the opinion that if the Bureau did not desire to use the stamps, the inserts could be of two different distinctive colors differentiating between the C.I. and S.I. subjects.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: May 12, 1951

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN

SUBJECT: SECURITY FLASH NOTICES

SECURITY INDEX

Reference is made to Bulet to New Haven dated 5/4/51 in the case entitled, " - SECURITY MATTER - C" (Bufile).

It is noted that the Bulet of reference sets out a summary of previous correspondence from this Office concerning and points out that in one case, in a request to have a Security Flash Notice posted, which is dated 3/29/51, this Office stated that was assigned FBI, whereas the memo from this Office dated 4/3/51 reflects that it is believed that was identical with the subject of FBI # . The Bulet of reference points out that requests for Security Flash Notices should not be forwarded to the Bureau unless positive identification with fingerprint records have been effected.

For the information of the Bureau it has been the practice of this Office to establish the identity of a particular subject as being identical or non-identical with an identification record which has been forwarded from the Bureau by comparing the background information contained in the file of the subject in this Office with that contained in the identification record submitted by the Bureau. In other words, if the background information contained in the file is identical with that contained in the identification record, this Office presumes that they are identical and requests that a Security Flash Notice be placed in the Bureau's Identification Section. In the event that the comparison reflects a material discrepancy, this Office withholds requesting a Security Flash Notice until the investigation has resolved the reason for the discrepancy. It is, of course, recognized that the only positive means of identification is by a comparison of fingerprints, but it has been the experience of this Office that fingerprints of SI subjects are not available for transmittal to the Bureau in order that a comparison may be made.

Therefore, unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau, this Office will continue to request that Security Flash Notices be placed on our SI subjects when by comparing the background information in the file with that reflected in the identification record returned from the Bureau, it is believed that the subject of our case file is identical with the subject of the identification record.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: May 10, 1951.

FROM : SAC, OMAHA

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

ReBuLet April 26, 1951.

The new security list has been received in this office and is being maintained in accordance with Bureau instructions.

The old list received with BuLet of December 29, 1950, has been destroyed by burning.

Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

653

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 27, 1951

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

list

*changed to
34-37*

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated February 7, 1951, attaching a list of the Security Index subjects in the New York office.

The attached list has been reconciled with the Security Index in the New York office with the suggested notations made thereon and is being returned to the Bureau with this letter.

Attachment

ENCLOSURE BEHIND FILE

EX-135

RECEIVED
FBI
MAR 3 2 38 PM '51

*Tracy
Zent
Dolan*

-34-37

EX - 85

60 MAY 25 1951 RECORDED - 135

13
21

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: May 11, 1951

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

The following is a report on the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on April 13, 1951.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
April 14-20	131	9	122
April 21-27	100	15	85
April 28-May 4	114	8	106
May 5-May 11	<u>141</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>137</u>
Totals	489	39	450

The Security Index count as of today is 15,527.

UNRECORDED 5-16-51
changed to
26-18

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 26, 1951

FROM : SAC, Los Angeles

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY INDEX

During a recent review of the administrative practices followed in the handling of the Security Index, I have noted that a considerable amount of clerical time is employed in retyping the complete description of the Subject on the backs of the two Security Index cards forwarded by the Bureau whenever a change in address or employment has been reported.

With the use of the new Form FD-136, the descriptive data contained on these cards is lengthy and it is necessary to type the information on the cards individually inasmuch as the use of carbon paper would result in smudged and illegible data. It is further noted that the repeated removal and restapling of photographs in connection with such changed cards will eventually result in the partial effacement of the photographs.

While I am aware that the Bureau has specifically denied approval to the suggestion that the old Security Index cards merely be stapled to the reverse of the new cards, it is believed that a considerable saving of clerical time would result from the adoption of the following procedure:

It is suggested that in the future, when changed cards are received from the Bureau, the complete description, together with the photograph, be placed upon a blank 5 x 8 card, and that this blank card thereafter serve as the reverse of all future Security Index cards issued concerning that individual. The use of the blank card would eliminate the possibility of error occurring as a result of the detachment of a new face card, and preparation of these cards would not result in additional clerical work inasmuch as the data at present must be placed upon the reverse of the cards furnished by the Bureau. With clerical help at a premium, it would appear that consideration should be given to adoption of this procedure.



(D) FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION RECORDS IN SECURITY INDEX CARD CASES --
Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 64, Series 1949, dated June 15,
1949, Paragraph E, Page 4.

Security flash notices shall not be submitted in cases where positive identifications have not been effected with fingerprint records or data are not furnished on which a positive identification may be based, i.e. fingerprints, name and FBI number or name and registry number.

In cases where fingerprint records have been furnished as being possibly identical with the subject and the office of origin is not able to effect a positive identification based on the information furnished, it is not necessary to communicate again with the Identification Division unless specifically requested to do so.

If it is desired that a flash notice be placed against the record which was furnished as being possibly identical, a security flash notice (FD-165) should be furnished. This record should include the name of the individual, and the FBI number of the record which was furnished as being possibly identical should be included in the flash notice. It is not necessary that the basis for making the identification be included in the request for the placing of the security flash.

It is the responsibility of the office of origin to effect

the identification where a record has been furnished as being possibly identical. If the circumstances are such as not to be strong enough to place the flash notice, no communication should be directed to the Identification Division.



65-148-14
48-14

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, FBI
FROM SAC, San Juan
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
San Juan, Puerto Rico

DATE: May 21, 1951

This is to advise that as a matter of policy, the San Juan Division is retaining Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico subjects on the Security Index even though they have received prison sentences of one year or more, pending the outcome of appeals and future prosecution for additional offenses by the Insular Government. They are so retained unless and until these subjects actually elect to serve the sentences imposed.

Due to the fact that these Security Index subjects were involved in the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico uprising of 1950 in a manner clearly indicating that they are capable of violence, it is felt that this policy is justified and it will be continued UCAB.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 23, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: / SECURITY INDEX CASES \

PURPOSE:

To submit for approval and inclusion in an SAC Letter instructions based upon a suggestion made at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference.

DETAILS:

There is attached for inclusion in an SAC Letter instructions to the field based upon a proposal made at the Internal Security-Espionage Conference recently held at the Bureau. This matter has been considered by the Executives' Conference and approved by the Director.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended the attached be incorporated in an SAC Letter and forwarded to the field, subject to your approval.

657
changed to
1-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *AS* Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Albany
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -- VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: May 31, 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

Re SAC Letter #26, 3/13/51.

As requested in referenced letter, the files on all Security Index Card subjects employed in vital facilities were reviewed as of March 15 last. Reports have been submitted in all cases where reports had not been submitted within six months prior to that date.

This office is currently verifying the addresses of Security Index Card subjects, and in this connection the cases will again be reviewed and current reports submitted in those cases wherein reports have not been submitted in the last six months preceding June 1, 1951.

list
658
Mr. Peyton Ford
Deputy Attorney General

May 31, 1951

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of individuals maintained in the Security Index. This list is subdivided alphabetically under the field offices of this Bureau covering the residence of the individuals listed.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

Delivered personally to Col. W.W. Naramore at Department. Old list & memo destroyed 8-26-51 per P.H.C.

RECORDED - 7

JUN 5 1951

EX - 63

iew for possible.

7

[Handwritten signatures and stamps]
JUN 5 1951
JUN 5 1951
JUN 5 1951

659

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :
FROM :
SUBJECT: . ~~LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES~~
SECURITY INDEX
Bufile

DATE: May 7, 1951

PURPOSE

To advise you concerning cases referred by the Loyalty Section to the Internal Security Section for review to determine if Security Index cards are warranted and to comment in particular as to why
are not on the Security Index.

DETAILS

A. Basis for Referring Results of LGE Investigations to the Internal Security Section.

When disloyal information falling in one of the following three categories is developed during an LGE investigation the matter is referred to the Internal Security Section for its consideration as to whether the particular individual on whom the derogatory information is developed should be made the subject of a Security Index card or whether further security investigation should be conducted. The three categories designated by number are set out as follows:

1. When the loyalty investigation developed either documentary evidence or admission on the part of the individual of past membership or affiliation in the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups.
2. When the loyalty investigation developed information through informants that the individual was a member or had made application for membership in the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups.
3. When the loyalty investigation developed a substantial amount of information reflecting activity on the part of the individual in subversive front organizations.

B. Action Taken by Security Index Desk.

When cases referred by the Loyalty Section are received at the Security Index desk the file and other subversive files, if any, are reviewed by the supervisor to whom the matter is assigned to determine:

1. Whether the facts developed warrant the individual's name being considered for the Security Index. If that is determined a review is made to be certain the office covering the residence of the subject has copies of all pertinent LGE reports and that office is requested to submit its recommendation regarding a Security Index card.
2. Whether additional investigation is necessary to follow the individuals activities before a determination can be made as to whether a Security Index card should be prepared. This, of course, depends on the information developed to date in the case. It is to be noted that the field has been instructed in loyalty matters to promptly furnish to the Bureau any derogatory information coming to the attention of the office subsequent to the completion of the LGE investigation.

C. List of Government Employees Referred Periodically to Attorney General by the Loyalty Section.

Reference is made to memorandum from to the Director dated January 11, 1951, which attached a synopsis of documentary evidence or admission of past Communist Party membership concerning 135 individuals who, according to the records of the Civil Service Commission, were still employed in the Government at that time and 22 individuals who have applications on file with the Commission for positions in various agencies. Similar lists are furnished to the Attorney General approximately every six months.

All of the 157 cases mentioned above have been referred to the Security Index desk by the Loyalty Section for review to determine if Security Index cards are warranted at the present time. Seven of the 135 individuals still employed in the Government are on the Security Index and 2 of the 22 individuals who have applications on file with the CSC are on the Security Index.

The remainder of the 157 individuals are not on the Security Index for various reasons but generally because the derogatory information developed to date is not such as warrants a name being placed on the Security Index according to present Bureau standards in that matter.

It is specifically pointed out that as a general rule the same standards are used for placing a name in the Security Index whether or not the individual is employed by the Federal Government. All factors of the case are fully considered before a decision is reached as to whether the person's name should be included in the Security Index. Generally, the remainder of the 157 individuals are not in the Security Index for the following reasons:

1. In certain instances the documentary evidence is a photostatic or photographic copy of an application for membership or a membership card in the Communist Party dated 1946 or prior which information is the only information of a disloyal nature developed.
2. In 6 of the cases the only information of a disloyal nature developed was an admission of Communist Party membership. These admissions occurred during interviews under Hatch Act cases, interviews by other Government agencies or in statements made in the application for federal employment. In those cases no additional derogatory information was developed during the investigation.
3. In many cases the derogatory information developed during the LGE investigation is over 5 years old and there is no current derogatory information available.
4. In certain cases, although there is evidence of past Party membership, the investigation also developed information that the person subsequently became disassociated from the Party.

D. Inquiries Regarding Specific Cases.

The question has been raised as to why are not on the Security Index. LGE investigations have been conducted on and an Atomic Energy Act - Applicant investigation has been conducted on

SAC, Omaha

May 31, 1951

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
REGISTERED MAIL
AIR MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECURITY INDEX - ~~GENERAL~~

ReBulet dated December 29, 1950.

There is enclosed herewith a sealed package containing a new Security Index list of all subjects maintained in the general and Special Sections of the Security Index.

This package should be maintained in your office safe in accordance with instructions in referenced memorandum. This new list replaces the list in your possession. It is your personal responsibility to see that the old list is destroyed by burning.


The Bureau should be advised of your receipt of the attached list and the destruction of the old list.

Enclosure

law for possible

RECORDED - 121

JUN 2 1951



7530

JUN 1 2 30 PM '51

Handwritten initials "H.S." and "P.H.C."

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 18, 1951.

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL


PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 111 new cards were added to the Security Index and 15 cards were canceled, a net increase of 96 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,623.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: May 25, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

O SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 137 new cards were added to the Security Index and 7 cards were canceled, a net increase of 130 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,753.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: ~~FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION RECORDS~~
IN SECURITY INDEX CARD CASES

DATE: May 7, 1951

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. ,


considered a proposed Letter to all Special Agents in Charge concerning fingerprint identification records in Security Index - Card cases.

For the Director's information, when a record is located in the Identification Division which may possibly be identical with the subject of a Security Index Card case, a copy of the record is furnished to the office of origin with the statement that if the office of origin determines the record to be identical, a flash notice will be posted against the fingerprint card in the Identification Division. It is the responsibility of the field offices to determine in these cases whether the record is or is not identical.

A number of communications have been received from the field indicating "it is believed the two are identical." This type of statement is not sufficiently positive for the placing of a flash notice and a new Letter to all Special Agents in Charge has been prepared pointing out the necessity of the field advising the Identification Division specifically whether the record submitted for their consideration is or is not identical with the subject.

The Conference unanimously recommends approval of the proposed Letter to all Special Agents in Charge.

Respectfully,
For the Conference,



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
COMSAB TABBING

DATE: 4/24/51

ReBulet April 13, 1951 reflecting that it did not appear to the Bureau that six Security Index subjects should be tabbed for COMSAB. It is deemed advisable that this office inform the Bureau as to the reason for these tabbings and secure the Bureau's advice in this regard.

Recently a review was made of the Security Index in this office and it was noted that several of the individuals have been in the armed services. No specific information was given as to the type of training they received in the armed services, however, it was deemed that since they had training in the armed services, either in the Army or the Navy, that training undoubtedly would deal with explosives in one manner or another and that consequently this office deemed it advisable to tab them for COMSAB. As a result of this FD-122 was submitted concerning

Although no mention is made in referenced letter concerning , FD-122 was also submitted on them, recommending tabbing for COMSAB. These two individuals received training in the Merchant Marine. is a radio operator and owns and operates a radio shop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. is also a radio operator, the knowledge of which he gained in the Merchant Marine working with . There is another angle, however, concerning and that is he works in the Railroad

DIRECTOR, FBI
SECURITY INDEX
COMSAB TABBING

4/24/51

shops at Albuquerque, New Mexico, which shops are not listed as a vital facility on the provisional list but which this office is considering making a vital facility as it is a vital transportation point.

Concerning [redacted], a review of this subject's file reflects that he was a chemist during the last war in an oil company near Houston, Texas and was of sufficient importance to get deferrment by his employment. His exact knowledge of chemistry is unknown, however, it was deemed that any chemist knows how to deal with explosives and, therefore, he was tabbed for COMSAB.

Regarding [redacted], this office had previously considered that she has access to the Kennecott Copper Company at Santa Rita, New Mexico, which is a vital facility. This access is rather remote in this respect. The IUMSW is the bargaining unit for laborers in the Kennecott Copper Company at Santa Rita.

Amalgamated Local 890 of Bayard, New Mexico. He is a key figure in this office. [redacted] enters into Union affairs and is extremely active in the Ladies Auxiliary. By virtue of this, she has previously been considered as having access to a vital facility.

The tabbing for COMSAB has been removed in this office concerning persons mentioned in referenced letter, however, the Bureau is requested to advise whether or not it considers that a person who has been in the Army and received the usual Army training has had sufficient training in which it is deemed advisable to tab for COMSAB. The Bureau is also requested to express its suggestions in regard to [redacted] and also [redacted].

May 28, 1951

SAC, Albuquerque

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX
COMSAB TABBING

Reurmemo dated April 24, 1951, concerning the tabbing of the Security Index cards of the individuals listed in Bureau letter of April 13, 1951.

The Bureau agrees that those subjects who have received military training should be tabbed for Comsab. It is not believed that the background and activity of and warrant their being tabbed for Comsab.

In accordance with the above, you should resubmit Form FD-122 recommending that those individuals who have received military training be tabbed for Comsab.

GENERAL

(C) SECURITY INDEX CASES -- The Bureau's attention has been directed to the fact that a lack of uniformity exists in the field in the handling of Security Index cases for the purpose of verifying the addresses of subjects each six months. Certain offices reopen and close Security Index cases when addresses are verified, others handle the cases on a pending inactive basis and still other offices follow these cases by use of an administrative tickler. In order to establish uniformity throughout the field, the Bureau desires that effective immediately the verifying of addresses in all Security Index cases be handled only by means of an administrative tickler. This practice will obviate the necessity of reopening the cases or carrying them as pending inactive solely for this purpose. The administrative ticklers can be followed each six months and all other administrative devices formerly in use in connection with this project may be eliminated.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

664 changed to

6-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, New York
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

DATE: June 4, 1951

Re SAC Letter No. 100, dated 12/2/50.

The Security Index was checked on May 29, 1951.

The Security Index cards maintained by this office are in an up-to-date status and references for all Security Index subjects have been checked within the last six months with the exception of a few subjects who have moved to cities in other divisions. In these cases the division to which the subject has moved has been requested to verify the subject's residence and employment in that division.

665
changed to
26-19

SAC, Los Angeles


May 31, 1951

Director, FBI

STATUS OF CASES ON
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS

Reurlet April 6, 1951, and Bulet April 23, 1951.
Referenced correspondence deals with the policy to be
followed by Field Offices in verifying addresses of
Security Index subjects. Your letter suggested that the
cases relating to Security Index subjects be maintained
in a pending inactive status.

This matter has been considered by the Bureau
and instructions were sent to the Field in SAC Letter
Number 53 dated May 26, 1951, Series 1951.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 1, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERALPURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 62 new cards were added to the Security Index and 7 cards were canceled, a net increase of 55 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 15,808.



667
Lynch
to
2-17

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

...mi • UNITEI

RNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 8, 1951

FROM : SAC, Atlanta

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC letter No. 20, Series 1951, dated 3-13-51.

In compliance with instructions contained in referenced SAC letter, this is to advise that an employment check of all security index subjects this division has been completed, checked against vital facilities list and form FD-122 submitted to the Bureau wherever necessary.

668 changed
to
37-21

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX


DATE: June 9, 1951

Remylet dated 12-29-49 and SAC Letter #53, Series 1951, dated 5-26-51 (Page 5).

The system presently followed by the Philadelphia Office in effecting verification of the residence and employment of each Security Index subject every six months, and which actually results in each case being reviewed approximately every five months, is fully set forth in the first referenced letter.

In accordance with referenced SAC Letter, the following changes are contemplated in the procedure presently followed. At the time of the above mentioned review, if it is determined that investigation is required to effect a verification, the agent assigned to the Security Index program, instead of recommending that the supervisor open and assign the case for investigation as heretofore, will merely prepare an administrative tickler card along with the usual FD-154. This tickler will contain the name of the subject and the file number and will be maintained by the supervisor of the #1 Squad, being set for approximately thirty days from the date of its preparation. At the expiration of that period, the file will then be examined by the supervisor to determine whether or not the agent to whom the FD-154 was routed has completed the verification.

It is believed that the above procedure will effectually carry out the instructions of the Bureau and will be adopted unless advice to the contrary is received.



Re: INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS OF SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

Reference made to page 30, C 2e of Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions in regard to interview, with prior Bureau authorization, of a subject of a Security investigation under certain conditions prior to the closing of a case in which a Security Index Card is not being recommended. The conditions enumerated in the Manual of Instructions are (1) when the investigation is inconclusive as to whether the subject is or has been a member of the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups, and (2) when investigation reflects that although the subject was known to have been formerly affiliated with subversive groups he subsequently discontinued his association and lost sympathy with the group.

The above instructions are hereby extended to include, in addition to the above, interviews of subjects of security investigations not on the Security Index, after prior Bureau authorization, to determine attitude, cooperativeness and potential dangerousness when the investigation develops information that a subject engaged in routine activities in the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups several years ago but no current subversive activity is developed, even though no specific information is reported that the subject has discontinued his association and lost sympathy with the subversive group.

Such interviews should be considered prior to closing the case when the subject's name is not being recommended for the Security Index unless certain unusual circumstances dictate otherwise. You must secure prior Bureau authorization before conducting an interview of this type.



6-11-51
The following procedure should be followed:

1. When an investigation is completed, the subject's name is not being recommended for the Security Index and unusual circumstances exist which dictate against the advisability of interviewing the subject, the reason an interview is not believed advisable should be indicated by cover memorandum accompanying the closing report in the case.

2. When an investigation is completed and the subject's name is not being recommended for the Security Index but you are considering interviewing the subject to determine his attitude, cooperativeness and potential dangerousness, you should submit a memorandum requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject. When a memorandum requesting authority to interview a subject is received at the Bureau, the Bureau must be in possession of a current investigative report. If the report is submitted at the same time as the request to interview, the report should be attached to the memorandum as an enclosure.

The memorandum requesting Bureau authorization to interview the subject of a case of this type must contain the following information, if available:

- (1) Residence address, occupation, employment and race of the subject.
- (2) Marital status. If married, the occupation, employment and race of the spouse.
- (3) Length of time the subject was a member of, or was affiliated with, subversive groups.
- (4) If married, any information indicating the spouse is or has been a member of, or affiliated with, subversive groups, the positions held in such groups, and the length of time of such membership or affiliation.
- (5) Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups.
- (6) Information regarding any defection, expulsion, inactivity and present sympathies of the subject and, if married, of the spouse.

Upon receipt of a request for interview the Bureau will advise whether or not authorization to conduct the interview is granted.

If authority is granted, the interview should be conducted immediately by two Special Agents who have a thorough knowledge of the individual case as well as all Bureau regulations regarding the development of informants. If the subjects prove

hostile or uncooperative it should, of course, be terminated immediately. All interviews should be well planned.

The results of the interview should be furnished the Bureau promptly by memorandum. If the subject, during the interview, is hostile or uncooperative you should consider this, along with the facts available in each individual case, in determining whether you should recommend subject's name for the Security Index. If you believe a Security Index card is warranted, Form FD-122 should be submitted as an enclosure to the memorandum reporting the results of the interview. If the subject is cooperative and additional interviews appear desirable for developing the subject as a confidential informant, or for other reasons, this fact should be included in the memorandum to the Bureau. Any information of value should be reduced to a signed statement if possible and you should ascertain whether the subject is willing to testify to such information in the future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

667

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE
SUBJECT: CASE ADMINISTRATION

DATE:

On April 16, 1951, the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs.

considered the question of uniformly handling the status of Security Index cases on individuals who have been placed on the Security Index. This question was considered by the Internal Security-Espionage Conference on April 2-3, 1951.

Internal Security-Espionage
Conference Suggestion:

The conference pointed out that some offices at the present time are reopening individual Security Index cases for the purpose of verifying the addresses of the subjects. Following the verification of the addresses (business and residence), the case is then closed. In other offices, the addresses are verified without reopening the case. There is a lack of uniformity in this procedure, and the conference felt that uniformity was desirable throughout the field in order to properly reflect the volume of work being handled by the Bureau. The conference recommended that the uniform procedure be followed of maintaining all Security Index cases in a pending inactive status in order that the cases could be assigned to agents and followed on the basis of a pending inactive case. It was felt this would permit a closer supervision in the handling of these cases and reflect the true condition of pending work in the field offices.

The New York Office was of the opinion that this would be an unnecessary administrative procedure. That office currently follows the policy of checking the addresses of Security Index subjects by assignment of the case to an Agent without reopening the case and without maintaining the case in a pending inactive status. The New York office felt this was the simplest procedure and would eliminate the maintenance of assignment cards and the administrative detail of opening and closing cases. The New York Office follows the verification of these addresses by means of an administrative tickler. The New York Office further felt that it would be misleading to show as pending in the various field offices a large number of cases opened solely for the purpose of verifying addresses.

The Detroit, Newark, Seattle and Boston Offices were in agreement with the New York Office.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference felt that there should be uniformity throughout the field in the handling of these cases. The Executives'

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Conference unanimously recommended against the opening and closing of the Security Index cases each six months for the purpose of checking the addresses of the subjects. It was felt that this furnished a padded picture of the work in the field and did not accurately reflect the number of matters handled by the field. It was pointed out that in many instances, these addresses can be verified telephonically. It was felt that an unnecessary administrative burden was also placed on the field by the opening and closing of these 15,000 plus cases each six months.

The Executives' Conference split on the question of whether these cases should be handled through administrative tickler or through maintaining them in a pending inactive status.

Messrs. [redacted] were of the opinion that a system now followed by the New York Office is correct and the verifying of the addresses in these cases each six months should be accomplished by the use of administrative ticklers. They felt that this was the simplest procedure and yet allowed the proper follow-up in the handling of the cases. They felt that any other system which would keep these cases in a pending inactive status would show an untrue picture of the actual pending work in the field offices. They recommended that the method of handling these cases again be re-examined on January 1, 1952.

The remainder of the Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] were of the opinion that these cases should be maintained in a pending inactive status. They felt that by this procedure the cases could be followed closely in the field and there would be a responsibility on the Agent to whom the case is assigned to properly channel all information concerning the subject into the appropriate file. They felt further that there is considerable effort expended in the verification of the addresses of these subjects each six months, particularly in the metropolitan areas where most of the subjects reside. While many of the addresses can be verified telephonically, in a great many instances in the metropolitan areas it is necessary to perform considerable investigation due to the movement of the Security Index subjects, both as to residences and employment. They felt that these cases should be kept pending inactive as they do involve work and the field should receive credit for them as pending matters which require attention at periodic intervals.

The field will be instructed in accordance with your approval in the over-all SAC Letter being prepared concerning the recommendations of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

670 changed to
34-45

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York 7, New York

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

CONFIDENTIAL

June 13, 1951

Director, FBI

Re: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Dear Sir:


Re SAC letters No. 26, 3/13/51, and No. 47, 5/12/51.

Pursuant to instructions contained on page 3 of SAC letter of 3/13/51, a project was initiated to determine whether reports in cases falling within the prescribed category had already been handled in accordance with the instructions cited, and to take steps to ensure that, in cases of this type not already so handled, reports would be written as directed.

It should be noted that during the time elapsed since the inception of this project, another project of bringing up to date the addresses of persons listed in our Security Index has also been in progress. As a result, a number of additional individuals have been found employed in vital facilities.

Approximately fifteen percent of the persons originally in this group at the beginning of this project were found to be no longer employed in the particular vital facility. In addition, upon review of the case files, it was found that in approximately thirty-nine percent of the cases, reports, dated within six months prior to the date of the SAC letter, 3/13/51, had been disseminated to other interested agencies. In regard to the remainder of the cases, originally found in this group subsequent to receipt of the letter of 3/13/51, the handling of them has been substantially completed by the preparation of current reports and also by sending copies of previous reports or letters summarizing previously developed information to the other interested agencies.

1



Confidential letter to Director, FBI
NY

Further, in connection with this matter, reference is made to SAC letter No. 47, 5/12/51, particularly page 4 of that letter, where instructions are set forth calling for a report to be written each six months on persons in our Security Index who are employed in "Key Facilities". "Key Facilities" appears to this office to be another descriptive term meaning the same as "Vital Facilities", which term was used in SAC letter of 3/13/51. Accordingly, SAC letter of 5/12/51, appears somewhat to supersede the instructions in the letter of 3/13/51, which did not call for reports every six months. As a result, the reports prepared pursuant to the letter of 3/13/51, have been marked closed in most instances. Now, however, we are in the process of reopening and assigning all cases on persons employed in installations included in the "Key Facilities" list in order to handle them in accordance with SAC letter of 5/12/51.

It may be noted that, as of 6/12/51, the group of individuals employed in vital facilities numbered 140 persons, but of course, this number will fluctuate somewhat because of deletions and additions.

It is felt that each case can best be followed by being assigned as long as the subject continues the employment in a Key Facility, although it is contemplated that each case will be kept in a pending inactive status during the six months between each report. Inasmuch as Bureau Bulletin No. 60, 11/2/50, page 11, appears to apply to persons employed in installations on the Key Facility list, the dual character of Internal Security Act of 1950 will be added to the normal character of these cases, unless advice is received from the Bureau to the contrary.

We will continue to make every possible effort to discharge properly the Bureau's responsibility in each of these cases.

Very truly yours,

April 30, 1951

SUGGESTED MANUAL CHANGE

There is attached page 44 of the Manual of Instructions with the suggested change underlined.

The change is based on information given the Field in SAC Letter Number 30, Series 1951, dated April 21, 1951, under the caption Security Index - GENERAL Comsab Program.

UNRECORDED

April 30, 1951

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL
SECTION 87C - SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

d. Comsab Program

All subjects of Security Index cards who because of their training or because of their position relative to vital industry or installations and who possess the potential to be Communist saboteurs should be considered under this program. The following should be tabbed Comsab:

All Security Index subjects that are:

(1) Employed in vital facilities;

(2) Veterans of military service in any country;

(3) Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services; and

(4) Graduates of the Lenin School in Russia.

In addition to the above, consideration should be given to individuals that are known to have engaged in acts of violence during industrial strikes and those who have engaged in acts of violence in fermenting trouble among laborers in industrial plants.

Indubitably there will be some cases arising where, because of the peculiar circumstances involved, it would not be desirable to tab for Comsab individuals falling within the above-described situations.

In the event such a case arises and you are uncertain as to what procedure should be followed the facts should be presented to the Bureau.

The geographical Security Index card of any individual coming within this purview should be tabbed with a metal signal tab attached to the card. Both the alphabetical and geographical card should contain the code word "Comsab." The Bureau should be advised of such tabbing by the use of Form FD 122 in order that the Bureau's card may likewise be tabbed. The communication should bear in the caption the title and character of the individual case. The Bureau should similarly be advised of the deletion of such tabbing. In the event of the transfer of the subject of a Security Index Card which card has been tabbed for Comsab, such tabbing is automatically deleted by both the new office of origin and the Bureau. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the new office of origin to consider the subject in the light of this program and determine if the subject is to be tabbed again. The new office of origin should so advise the Bureau.

e. Tabbing of Security Index Cards for Priority Purposes (Petcom)

The Petcom Program is concerned with individuals on the Security Index who are to be given priority arrest in the event of apprehension

ENC 1

of security index subjects at the time of an emergency. As such, the original (geographical) Security Index Cards of individuals falling into the following categories must be tabbed for Detcom:

- (1) All Top Functionaries
- (2) All Key Figures
- (3) All individuals tabbed under the Consab program
- (4) Any other individual who, though he does not fall in the above groups, should be given priority arrest because of some peculiar circumstances.

No effort should be made to distinguish between the various degrees of priority.

Each Special Agent in Charge should advise the Bureau of the cards so tabbed in order that a like tabbing system may be followed at the Bureau. This may be done by the use of Form FD-122 which should carry in the caption the title and character of the individual case. The cards should be tabbed with a metal signal tab attached to the card. All individuals tabbed under the Detcom program should be tabbed with a contrasting colored tab from those tabbed under the Consab program. The Security Index Cards of Detcom subjects should not be of any particular distinguishing color. The Security Index Cards, both alphabetical and geographical, should contain the card word Detcom.

In the event of the transfer of the subject of a Security Index card which card has been tabbed for Detcom, such tabbing is automatically deleted by both the new office of origin and the Bureau. It is, therefore, again incumbent upon the new office of origin to consider the subject in the light of this program and immediately advise the Bureau if the card is to be tabbed again.

f. Submitting Names to Bureau for Indexing Purposes

Offices shall be alert to supply the Bureau, for indexing purposes, the name of additional individuals who become associated with

ENC 2

67/
changed
to
12-8

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6-12-51

FROM : SAC, DALLAS

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letter #100 dated 12-28-50.

The Security Index Cards in this office are in an up-to-date status and have been checked within the last six months. The semi-annual re-check is in progress at this time.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: May 29, 1951

FROM : SAC, Detroit

SUBJECT: Fingerprint Identification Records in Security Index Card Cases

Re section D, SAC letter Number 47, Series 1951 re submission of Security Flash letters. As of this writing there are 835 Subjects on the Detroit Security Index and that the Identification Division has been able to effect an estimated 650 positive identifications. The result, of course, is that Security Flash Stops have been placed against the records of over three-fourths of the Subjects now on our Index.

Further, this high percentage of Stops was effected in the majority of cases despite the fact that positive identification data, ie., fingerprints, name and FBI number or name and registry number were not available to this office at the time the Security Flash forms were submitted. It is felt that Detroit is in an unusual position in this regard due to the heavy industrialization in this area and due to the fact that fingerprinting of employees was carefully practiced during World War II in those plants which have always attracted CP employees.

Referred SAC letter appears to rule out the most productive type of Security Flash Notice available to Detroit, ie, that in which it appears possible that the Subject may have been printed by a defense plant during World War II. In support of our belief that the "name check" type of Identification search based upon the foregoing is very often successful your attention is invited to three typical Identification records received by Detroit today. In the cases of

positive Identification Stops have been posted despite the fact that this office did not have definite identification data at the time the Security flash notices were submitted.

These Identification Stops have already begun to show results. One record received today in the case of _____ gives a current lead as to his employment and considerable agent time will be saved as a result of its receipt.

Based on favorable local experience, this office would like to continue to submit Security Flash Notices in all cases except those involving housewives (where there is no history of employment) even though no specific identification data has been established and will continue to do so UACB.

672 Changed to

SAC Detroit
Director, FBI

15-15

6-2-51


Fingerprint Identification Records
in Security Index Card Case

Reurlet of May 29, 1951.

With reference to Section D, SAC Letter #47, Series 1951, dated May 12, 1951, it is now intended that the field offices be precluded from having a name search made of the Identification Division files. All descriptive data available should be furnished in connection with requesting such name searches. It is intended, however, that the field offices not request a security flash notice be posted into the Identification Division records except where it is determined by a field office that the record is that of the subject of the Security Index case. Further, a positive identification in these cases is not limited to those instances where a comparison was made of fingerprints, or name and FBI number, or name and registry number.

The purpose of the SAC Letter was to call attention that the burden of determining whether or not the record is identical with the subject lies with the field office. The Identification Division of the Bureau should not be sent correspondence worded "It is believed that the identification record # _____ is identical with the subject of instant case," thus placing the final determination of identity on the Bureau.

Where it is determined that a flash notice has been posted into a fingerprint record which is not identical with the subject, you should, of course, advise the Bureau, Attention Identification Division, to cancel such a flash notice.



673
changed
to
33-9

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, New Orleans
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX AND VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: June 15, 1951

CONFIDENT

Re SAC Letter #26, Series 1951, dated March 13, 1951, and New Orleans letter to Bureau dated May 14, 1951.

A review of the Security Index made upon receipt of SAC Letter #26 reflected a total of six subjects employed in a vital facility or having access thereto. In each case, the vital facility concerned was the Port of New Orleans, in which the Coast Guard is the contributing and responsible agency. In each of these six cases, a current report has been submitted with distribution to the Coast Guard.

Subsequent to the receipt of SAC Letter #26, three additional Security Index subjects have been employed on the river front thus giving them access to the Port of New Orleans and vital facilities. These cases are presently being handled and reports will be disseminated to the Coast Guard. If additional cases arise of individuals on the Security Index employed in vital facilities, instructions in SAC Letter #26 will be carried out.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE:

June 13, 1951

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951 dated 3/13/51, sub-section A, captioned as above setting out instructions concerning the handling of Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities and requesting that the Bureau be advised by letter when all of the requested reports have been submitted.

This is to advise that an employment check has been made of all Security Index subjects in this division and form FD-122 has been submitted on all of those employed in vital facilities. In those instances where a report had not been submitted within the six-months' period prior to receipt of referenced SAC letter, a report has now been prepared and submitted.

675 changed to

18-11

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: June 15, 1951

FROM : SAC, Honolulu

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26(A), dated March 13, 1951, and airtel dated April 14, 1951.

The Bureau is advised that current reports have been submitted on each Security Index subject employed in a vital facility in this Division in accordance with the requirements of reBulet. Also, appropriate dissemination of these reports has been made to local agencies and the necessary "Comsab" designations recommended to the Bureau on Forms FD-122.

Arrangements have been effected to maintain this program in a current status at all times.

676
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to
29-9

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Miami


SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES
MIAMI FIELD DIVISION

DATE: June 15, 1951

Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 26 dated March 13, 1951, Paragraph A. Further reference is made to Miami letter to the Bureau dated March 28, 1951 advising that in compliance with Bureau instructions current reports were being prepared and disseminated on Security Index subjects presently employed in vital facilities in the Miami Division.

This is to advise that a current report has been prepared on every Security Index subject employed in a vital facility in the Miami area. These reports have been disseminated to the interested agencies.

These instructions will be kept in mind continually and when information is developed indicating that any Security Index subject secures employment at a vital facility a current report will be prepared and disseminated pursuant to the instructions in the referenced SAC letter.



677 changed
to
47-25

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

AIR MAIL

DATE: 6/15/51


FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter 26, Series 1951, mylet 3/21/51, and Bulet 3/27/51.

For the information of the Bureau, reports have been submitted on all Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities, except those employed on the San Francisco waterfront. In accord with Bureau letter dated 3/27/51, reports will be submitted on all waterfront workers whose names appear on the Security Index by 9/17/51. Such reports have been disseminated locally to G-2, DIO and Coast Guard.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6-15-51


FROM : SAC, Kansas City

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC letter No. 26, Series 1951, dated 3-13-51 Section A,
captioned as above and letter from this office dated 5-7-51.

This is to advise the Bureau of an additional security index
subject in the Kansas City Office who is presently employed in a vital
facility. This individual is , was. , whose
security index card was recently approved by the Bureau. This subject
is employed at the plant operated by General Motors Corporation, Buick-
Pontiac-Oldsmobile Division, Fairfax, Kansas City, Kansas.

In compliance with instructions, the report of Special Agent
dated at St. Louis, Mo. 3-27-51 entitled "
, wa. , Security Matter - C" and descriptive information
and background information as to have been forwarded to
, District 13, Office of Special
Investigations, U. S. Air Forces, Offutt Air Base, Omaha, Nebraska, which
Agency has the security responsibility of the above facility.

678
changed
to
23-10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: 6-11-51

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
VITAL FACILITIES

Re SAC Letter No. 26, Series 1951 dated 3-13-51.

With respect to that portion of report concerning current reports on Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities, it is to advise that a current report has been submitted on each such subject within the past six months currently maintained in the Richmond Office and that proper dissemination has been made. Attention is directed to the report of SA [redacted] dated 4-2-51 in the case entitled [redacted], SECURITY MATTER -

Bureau File No. [redacted]. It is noted that copies of this report were not indicated for dissemination. However, it is noted that the facility in which [redacted] is employed is of interest to the Army and security responsibility rests with that agency. In view of this, a copy of this report has been made available locally to a C.I.C. representative at Richmond, Virginia.

Instant letter is in reply to Bureau request that you be advised when all of the requested reports have been submitted.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 15, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX - GENERAL

PURPOSE

To advise you of the total cards in the Security Index.

DETAILS

During the past week, 114 new cards were added to the Security Index and 12 cards were canceled, a net increase of 102 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 16,043.



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: June 8, 1951

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY FLASH NOTICES

Security Index - GENERAL

Reference is made to the attached letter from the New Haven Division dated May 12, 1951, regarding the above subject matter.

We have had considerable correspondence with the New Haven Division regarding security flash notices and apparently they are not clear on the policy to be followed in placing security flash notices in the Identification Division files.

Pursuant to your instructions I spoke to Special Agent of the New Haven Division, who is in service, and informed him with regard to the policy and instructed him to bring this to the attention of the supervisor of security index cases in the New Haven Office as well as the Special Agent in Charge.

I pointed out that there was no objection to requesting name searches regarding security index subjects and that, in fact, it was desired. I pointed out, however, that with regard to the problems at hand the responsibility of determining if a record furnished by the Identification Division based upon descriptive information to the New Haven Office regarding a subject as being or not being identical lies with the division offices and that if they determine the individual to be identical then they should request a security flash notice be posted if the circumstances warrants one.

I pointed out to Special Agent that the field office should not submit unnecessary correspondence to inform why they came to the conclusion nor to use the expression "believed to be identical." It was entirely up to their good judgment and that if they determined it was identical they should merely ask for the placing of a notice by furnishing the FBI number of the record and discontinue forwarding correspondence to the Bureau which serves no purpose.

No further action necessary.



Re: SECURITY INDEX/SUBJECTS -
ABSENCE OF CURRENT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY

In many instances current investigations conducted on subjects whose names were placed on the Security Index several years ago have failed to develop positive evidence of current

subversive activity in the Communist Party or other Marxist or revolutionary groups. Due to security measures adopted by the Communist Party and other revolutionary groups, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to develop evidence of current subversive activities, and individuals have gone underground or divorced themselves from open participation in Party activities because of instructions issued by the Communist Party.

Although a current investigation conducted on a Security Index subject fails to develop positive evidence of current subversive activity, the subject may be a "sleeper," and the subject's name should be continued in the Security Index unless there is some positive development justifying a recommendation that the Security Index Card be cancelled in line with present instructions in regard to cancelling Security Index Cards.

In other words, the absence of information reflecting current subversive activity when there is no positive development justifying contrary action is not a sufficient reason for considering an individual presently on the Security Index as no longer dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : / Director, FBI

DATE: 6/23/51

FROM : SAC, MobileSUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
MOBILE DIVISION

Re Section C, SAC Letter 100, 12/28/50.

This is to advise that the Security Index Cards in this Division are up to date and the addresses of all security index subjects have been checked within the past six months with the following two exceptions:

One subject, , Bufile
is reliably reported living in South America and Bureau
was advised 6/2/51 with request to cancel index card.

One subject, , Bufile
is reportedly in California and the Los Angeles
Office is presently attempting to verify his address in
that city.

682
changed
to
6-11

683
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to
6-12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

Memorandum • UNITED

GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI CONFIDENTIAL


FROM : SAC, Buffalo

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - VITAL FACILITIES

DATE: June 16, 1951

Re SAC Letter #26, Series 1951, March 13, 1951.

In accordance with instructions contained in Part A, last paragraph, Page 3, of reference letter, this is to advise that with two exceptions reports have been submitted by this office within the time mentioned in referenced letter concerning Security Index subjects employed in vital facilities. A review of these cases has been made and where not previously done, copies have been submitted to the interested agencies.



684
6-8-51

SUGGESTION:

(2) forwarded a suggestion from
that Security Index cases be maintained in a pending
inactive status and assigned. view was that,
since addresses on Security Index subjects are verified
every 6 months, keeping cases pending inactive and assigned
will be reflected in our statistical accomplishments
and will reduce the clerical time and effort necessary to
open and close these cases every 6 months.

SECURITY AND ESPIONAGE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

This matter was considered by the recent Security and
Espionage Conference and was handled by SAC Letter #53,
dated 5/26/51, which provides that Security Index subject
cases are not to be maintained pending inactive or assigned
but are to be followed on a 6-month tickler in order that
addresses may be verified. For this reason, the Joint
Committee did not consider this suggestion.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

OK
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